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Democracies die behind closed doors.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Three-year-old Nicholas Terraszas was killed when his family's Ford
Explorer, equipped with Firestone tires, suddenly flipped over on a
California freeway in 1999.2 Neither his family nor the majority of the public
had any idea that Ford and Firestone had already been sued more than fifty
times over similar injuries and deaths.3 Almost every one of those lawsuits
was settled secretly, ensuring that the press and the public would not find out
about the tire-tread separation allegedly causing the injuries.4 The full picture
of that risk only came to light after years of preventable injuries and deaths
* Juris Doctor Candidate, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law,
Expected May 2004. Winner of Outstanding Student Note, OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON
DIsPuTE RESOLUTION, 2003. This Note is dedicated to the memory of Joshua J. Morrow,
Ohio State Law Class of 1998, who inspired me and countless others with his passion for
the law and compassion for humanity.
I Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002). Upholding the
tradition of access to judicial proceedings, the Sixth Circuit held that the executive branch
could not close all deportation proceedings in "special interest" cases concerning
suspected terrorists without individualized determination of the need for closure. Id.
The First Amendment, through a free press, protects the people's right to know
that their government acts fairly, lawfully, and accurately in deportation
proceedings. When government begins closing doors, it selectively controls
information rightfully belonging to the people. Selective information is
misinformation. The Framers of the First Amendment "did not trust any government
to separate the true from the false for us." They protected people against secret
government.
Id. (citations omitted).
2 Adam Hochberg, Analysis: Growing Unease Among Judges and Legislators Over
Secret Legal Settlements (National Public Radio, All Things Considered, Oct. 11, 2002).
His family is suing both companies for wrongful death. Id.
3 Id. (referring to suits filed and settled confidentially in the 1990s).
4 1d.
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when journalists and consumer advocates pieced together the information
contained in those individual lawsuits. 5
Such secrecy is not the exception, it is the rule. 6 The majority of legal
disputes are never revealed to the public.7 Between confidential settlements,
arbitration, and mediation, most disputes are resolved in private. 8 In most
cases, there is no great public interest involved-it is merely a disagreement
over a contract or a business deal gone bad that does not deserve journalistic
attention. 9 The public is not usually harmed when such matters are disposed
of outside of the courts. However, what begins as a mundane private dispute
between parties can end up being an issue of enormous public interest or
public risk.10 Thus, the growing popularity of alternative dispute resolution
has grave implications for the First Amendment freedom of the press and the
public's right to know about issues of public interest and safety.'"
The shift from public to private justice is eroding the public's
constitutional right to be informed as more crucial issues are concealed by
alternative dispute resolution. 12 Lawyers, 13 judges 14 and journalists 15 have
5 1d.
6 Andrew D. Miller, Federal Antisecrecy Legislation: A Model Act to Safeguard the
Public from Court-Sanctioned Hidden Hazards, 20 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 371, 372
(1993). More than 97% of all civil suits are settled before they go to trial, according to
the Center for Negotiation and Conflict Resolution at Rutgers University. Id. at 414 n.5;
see also STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION,
MEDIATION AND OTHER PROCESSES 6 (3d ed. 1999). About 20% of all civil suits are
disposed of by some pre-trial adjudication. Id.
7 THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS AND LEGAL RIGHTS 3 (2002). Out of
every ten claims filed for accidental injuries, only two result in a lawsuit being filed. Id.
at 3 n. 13 (citing DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN
THE UNITED STATES 121 (1991)).
8 Id. at3.
9 STEVE WEINBERG, THE REPORTER'S HANDBOOK: AN INVESTIGATOR'S GUIDE TO
DOCUMENTS AND TECHNIQUES 268 (1996). In fact, most civil suits, whether they are of
public interest or not, never come to the attention of journalists because of limited time
and resources. Id.
10 Miller, supra note 6, at 372; see also Hochberg, supra note 2. "If we don't know
what dangers lurk in an operating room, in a vehicle, in a nursery, how can we protect
ourselves?" said Gail Segal, an Illinois consumer advocate seeking to ban confidential
settlements in her state. "We can't know what we should be wary of if that kind of
information is hidden away." Id.
11 In this Note, I will be using the phrase "alternative dispute resolution" to refer to
negotiated settlements, arbitration, and mediation. I will use the term "settlements" to
refer to negotiated settlements that arise out of traditional litigation and will refer to
arbitration and mediation specifically.
12 See infra Part II. The necessary corollary of the First Amendment freedom of the
press is the public's First Amendment right to be informed by the press. See Richmond
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criticized the trend of private justice under alternative dispute resolution.
Many of the previous lawsuits regarding sexual abuse by priests in the
Roman Catholic Church were settled privately. 16 A federal judge sent the
government's antitrust case against Microsoft into mediation. 17 The Ohio
Supreme Court sent to mediation a lawsuit over the constitutionality of
Ohio's school-funding formula, the largest public financing dispute in state
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) (holding the press has a First
Amendment right to attend public trials).
13 See Robert A. Clifford, Pretense Is Gone in Sealing Court Records, CHI.
LAWYER, Apr. 2002, at 12.
14 See Sunlight or Shadow: South Carolina Bans Sealed Settlements, Federal Court
Adopts First Such Rule But Complex Issues Arise in Making It Work, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 2,
2002, at S6; S.C. Takes Lead in Opening Lawsuit Settlements to Public View,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 23, 2002.
15 See Congress Sends Alternative Dispute Resolution Bill to President, NEWS
MEDIA UPDATE, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,, Nov. 2, 1998, at
http://www.rcfp.org/news/1998/1102j.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2003) [hereinafter NEWS
MEDIA UPDATE]. Representatives of the Reporters Committee, a non-profit lobbying and
legal defense group, testified in front of the U.S. Administrative Conference against what
ultimately became the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, which provides that
local court rules may set the confidentiality of ADR proceedings. The committee
objected that the Act violates the First Amendment right of access to the courts by
allowing some proceedings to be closed; see also WEINBERG, supra note 9, at 257.
Weinberg argues that secret settlements and precedent snuffing, discussed infra at Part
III, infringes on reporters' ability to investigate. "Truth is sometimes the first casualty in
a system that is grounded in advocacy." Id. See generally Ashley Gauthier, Secret
Justice, Alternative Dispute Resolution, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,
at http://www.rcfp.org/secretjustice/adr/series.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2003).
16 See, e.g., C.R. & S.R. v. E., 573 So. 2d 1088, 1088-89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(Cobb, J., dissenting). A Catholic diocese and two parents entered into a settlement
containing a confidentiality agreement after binding arbitration held that a priest had
molested their daughter. The court upheld the enforceability of the confidentiality
agreement despite claims that it was against public policy and Florida law mandating
reporting of child abuse. Id.; see also Glenn F. Bunting, L.A. Priest Blamed for Legacy of
Pain, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2002, at Al.
17 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
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history. 18 Thousands of consumer cases are resolved every year through
mandatory arbitration. 19
The erosion of information under privatized justice occurs on all fronts.
Confidential settlements, especially pre-trial ones, can bury an issue or
mislead the public as to the magnitude of a problem.20 Arbitration of
consumer or employment complaints can hide a pattern of abuse by a
company or industry. 21 Alternative dispute resolution can prevent the public
from knowing that a public safety risk exists. 22 These private mechanisms
are often intended to avoid publicity, which they easily accomplish because
the disputes are never entered onto a court docket; they are unlikely ever to
come to the attention of the press or consumer advocates, who serve as the
public's watchdogs. 23
18 DeRolph v. Ohio, 758 N.E.2d 1113, 1116 (2001). The Ohio Supreme Court had
previously ruled that Ohio's school-funding formula was so inequitable that it was
unconstitutional. DeRolph v. Ohio, 677 N.E.2d 733, 759 (1997). When the parties and the
legislature failed to devise a funding formula that would meet the court's standards for a
"thorough and efficient education" as guaranteed by Ohio's constitution, the Ohio
Supreme Court sent the lawsuit to mediation. DeRolph, 758 N.E.2d at 1116. The
mediation attempt ultimately failed. See infra'Part IV.B.
19 Reynolds Holding, Can Public Count on Fair Arbitration?: Financial Ties to
Corporations Are Conflict of Interest, Critics Say, S.F. CHRONICLE, Oct. 8, 2001, at A15.
20 See Gleba v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., No. 98-230, Mass. Super. LEXIS 364, at
*9-10 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 2001). The court invalidated a confidentiality agreement
in a wrongful death suit regarding a defective door latch on a Dodge Aries because it
unjustifiably infringed on the public's right to know about product defects. Id. at *2-3, 9.
"Interference with this right can endanger members of the public by keeping them
oblivious to actual risks or hazards that have already caused death or other harm to
others." Id. at *9.
21 See, e.g., Jordan Rau, Stalking the Predators: State Legislature Eyes More
Restrictions on Lending, NEWSDAY, Jun. 27, 2001, at A6. In response to complaints from
consumer groups, the New York legislature considered banning mandatory arbitration in
consumer credit complaints. Id.; see also Corporate Responsibility: Before the
Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism Committee on
Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 10 8th Cong. (2002) (statement of Joan
Claybrook, President, Public Citizen). Claybrook testified that financial companies were
forcing consumers to arbitrate claims of securities fraud, which had the effect of hiding a
widespread abuse by the industry. Id.; Charles Ornstein, Closer Look at Complaints on
HMOs Urged, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15. 2002, at pt. 2, at 8. California wants to review
arbitration cases involving patients to discover patterns of abuse but industry
representatives say it would be an undue invasion of privacy. Id.
22 See Hochberg, supra note 2.
23 WEINBERG, supra note 9, at 218. As "most law is practiced outside of
courthouses," journalists are at a disadvantage because most legal disputes will not come
to their attention through traditional reporting. Id.
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The public suffers when the press cannot report accurately on the issues
revealed by our open litigation system. The press is constitutionally entitled
to attend court proceedings and report on their contents so that it may serve
as the public's eyes and ears.24 This is the benchmark that has been set, not
only by the courts but by the very structure of our democratic system.
25
However, this constitutional benchmark is being eroded, slowly but surely,
by the expansion of privatized justice. The first stage of erosion occurs when
disputes of public importance are covered up with secret settlements and
precedent snuffing.26 The public is denied the opportunity to learn of the
merit and outcome of litigation that would otherwise have been open to
scrutiny. The second stage of erosion, under mediation and arbitration, is
even more devastating to the right to know: The public is denied notice that a
dispute exists as well as any information about the substance of the dispute,
rendering the right to know virtually meaningless. 27
This Note will demonstrate how the constitutional right of public access
to vital public information under traditional litigation is being eroded by
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as confidential settlements,
mediation, and arbitration. Part II of this Note will introduce readers to the
practices of the press under traditional litigation to investigate issues of
public interest and safety. This section will set the benchmark for public
access against which other mechanisms will be measured. Part III will then
explore the first stage of erosion of public information: the constriction of
access by confidential settlements under traditional litigation. Part IV will
examine the second stage of erosion under mediation and arbitration: the
public is denied notice of a dispute; information about alternative procedures
and its substance; as well as the ability to scrutinize the players and hold
them accountable. Part V will conclude with recommendations to ensure that
the press and public will have access to important information about issues of
public safety and interest. These recommendations include: banning
confidential settlements in areas such as public health and safety, consumer
issues, and public interest; publicizing the existence and results of mediated
and arbitrated disputes; and educating the press and the public about their
rights of access under all forms of dispute resolution.
24 See, e.g., Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002). See
supra text accompanying note 1.
25 Id.
26 See infra Part III.
27 See infra Part TV.
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II. THE BENCHMARK: INFORMING THE PUBLIC THROUGH TRADITIONAL
LITIGATION
Justice has always been public in the United States.28 Trials are
conducted in public for the dual purposes of safeguarding the integrity of our
judicial system and as a means of informing the public about issues of
importance. 29 In order to effectively serve as a watchdog for the public,
journalists have a constitutional right to attend court proceedings as well as
to report on other information revealed through the litigation process.30
However, this constitutional right is being eroded by various means of
alternative dispute resolution, which shift disputes from the public forum into
privatized proceedings. 31
A. Democracy Requires a Free Press and Open Trials
It is essential to our political system that judicial proceedings are
conducted in public as a means of ensuring democracy. 32 In one of Alexis de
Tocqueville's most famous commentaries on the American political system,
28 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980). The Court
found that an open judicial system is "no quirk of history; rather, it has long been
recognized as an indispensable attribute of an Anglo-American trial." Id. Such
distinguished jurists as Matthew Hale and William Blackstone argued in the 17th and
18th centuries that open trials were necessary because they "gave assurance that the
proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it discouraged perjury, the
misconduct of participants, and decisions based on secret bias or partiality." Id. (citations
omitted). The Richmond Court also quoted 19th century legal theorist Jeremy Bentham,
who wrote:
Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity,
all other checks are of small account. Recordation, appeal, whatever other
institutions might present themselves in the character of checks, would be found to
operate rather as cloaks than checks; as cloaks in reality, as checks only in
appearance.
Id. (citing 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JuDIcIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827)).
Bentham also wrote that open trials "enhanced the performance of all involved,
protected the judge from imputations of dishonesty, and served to educate the public."
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S at 569, n.7; see also Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303
F.3d 681, 703-04 (6th Cir. 2002). The court held that deportation proceedings should be
open to the press to serve as "perhaps the only check on abusive government practices."
Id. at 704.
29 Id.
30 LYLE W. DENNISTON, THE REPORTER AND THE LAW 3 (1980).
31 See infra Part IV.
32 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571-73.
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he wrote, "[s]carcely any question arises in the United States which does not
become, sooner or later, a subject of judicial debate." 33 The purpose of an
open judicial system is to safeguard justice by opening its processes to the
light of day, to make sure that parties are treated fairly. 34 Yet another equally
important function is to reveal the content of litigation to the press and the
public. 35 As the Ford-Firestone case demonstrates, the litigation process
provides the press and the public with much valuable information that
extends beyond just the mere results of each case or controversy. 36 Our open
court system does not accidentally reveal such information; it is structurally
designed to do so. 37 That information is seriously constrained by alternative
dispute resolution, which constricts the ability of the press to inform the
public about important issues.
Alternative dispute resolution poses a threat to the public's right to know
in part because it is not designed to inform the public. Alternative dispute
resolution conceives of the judicial system as just one of many alternative
mechanisms to resolve disagreements between parties, to establish peace
rather than justice. 38 Critics of alternative dispute resolution have argued that
the legal system also exists to give force to our collective rights and values
through public debate and resolution. 39 Yet there is another crucial function
of the judicial process: bringing to light issues of vital public interest that
could otherwise be hidden from view by powerful private parties.40 It is this
critical purpose of our open judicial system that is threatened by the growing
trend toward privatizing justice.
33 DENNISTON, supra note 30, at 3. De Tocqueville was a French writer who wrote
Democracy in America, a two-volume study of the American people and their political
institutions based on his observations of 19th century America.
34 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571.
35 DENNISTON, supra note 30, at 3. "When journalism succeeds in disclosing the
truth, it informs the community's capacity to function. That, too, can produce justice." Id.
at xvii.
36 See Hochberg, supra note 2.
37 See supra text accompanying note 28.
38 See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
39 Id. at 1085. The legal system exists to "explicate and give force to the
values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes; to interpret
those values and to bring reality into accord with them." Id.
40 See infra Parts 11, 1I, and IV.
685
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B. Practical Implications of Freedom of the Press and Public Trials
A free press cannot function adequately without access to court
proceedings. 41 As every rookie reporter learns early in his or her career,
some of the richest sources of information on almost any issue are the
testimony and documents that are produced publicly during the course of
litigation. 42 Journalists have long used such documents to gather information
for many purposes and stories, whether they are about the particular dispute,
the parties involved, or other issues of public interest that are only
incidentally related to the case at hand.43 For example, in 2002 the
Washington Post won a Pulitzer Prize for uncovering widespread abuse
within the foster care system in Washington, D.C. that lead to the death of
229 children in the system's custody.44 Much of the information in the article
was uncovered by reading publicly-available court documents which detailed
the allegations. 45
Journalists prefer to quote from publicly available court documents
because they are usually protected from legal challenges such as libel and
defamation. 46 Under the fair reporting privilege, journalistic reports on the
41 Comments on [National Center for State Courts] Draft for Comment Model
Policy on Public Access to Court Records, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press, Apr. 15, 2002, at http://www.rcfp.org/news/documents/20020415modelctacc.html
(last visited Dec. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Reporters Committee, Comments]. The
committee objects to replacing the presumption of openness of judicial proceedings with
a balancing test because a free press depends on having access to information of vital
public interest. Id.
42 WEINBERG, supra note 9, at 217; see also GEORGE M. KILLENBERG, PUBLIC
AFFAIRS REPORTING: COVERING THE NEWS IN THE INFORMATION AGE 205-06 (1992);
KELLY LEITER, ET AL., THE COMPLETE REPORTER: FUNDAMENTALS OF NEWS GATHERING,
WRITING AND EDITING 337-40 (2000).
43 WEINBERG, supra note 9, at 268. "It cannot be stressed enough: Court files
provide a mountain of documents to use in stories that have nothing to do with the court
system." Id. For example, the famously reclusive Howard Hughes had no driver's license,
never voted and owned almost nothing in his own name. But investigative reporters were
able to glean some information about the billionaire because he was once sued for slander
by a former aide. Id.; see also Reporters Committee, Comments, supra note 41.
44 See, e.g., Scott Higham & Sari Horwitz, Awaiting Help, D.C. Ward Slain; Judge
Ordered Agency to Get Drug Treatment for Teen, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2001, at Al; see
also Reporters Committee, Comments, supra note 41.
45 Reporters Committee, Comments, supra note 41 (noting that the journalists' in-
depth investigation would not have been possible without electronic access to court
documents).
46 KENT R. MIDDLETON ET AL., THE LAW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 147-49 (2002
update ed.).
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contents of judicial proceedings are protected from such suits if their reports
of the proceedings are accurate and fair.47 Information that is gathered
through court documents and proceedings, even though it is potentially
defamatory, is protected as long as the reports fairly represent the source of
the information as the judicial proceeding. 48 This qualified privilege can be
extended to all public elements of a proceeding, from the filing of a
complaint to publicly-available depositions and settlement agreements. 49
The public and its proxy-the press-have long had a right to attend
most criminal and civil trials.50 Court proceedings are presumed open unless
there is an overriding countervailing interest, such as in juvenile matters. 51
The courts have also generally upheld the press and public's right to access
documents that are made public and used through traditional litigation. 52 The
47 Brown v. Hearst Corp., 862 F. Supp. 622, 629 (D. Mass. 1994), affd, 54 F.3d 21
(1st Cir. 1995); see also Dorsey v. National Enquirer, Inc., 973 F.2d 1431, 1434 (9th Cir.
1992). This privilege protects journalists even if the content of documents is determined
to be false, as long as the reporter accurately represents a judicial proceeding or other
governmental source. Id.
48 See Dorsey, 973 F.2d at 1434.
491d.; see also Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 282, 285 (4th Cir. 2000)
(discussed infra at notes 74-77).
50 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573. "[A] presumption of openness inheres in
the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice." Id. The First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press combines with the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of fair and public trials to give the press a right to attend judicial proceedings.
Id. The right to attend court proceedings was codified as early as 1267 in the Statute of
Marlborough. Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1068 (3d. Cir. 1984). The
English statute was interpreted in the early 17th century as requiring that "all Causes
ought to be heard, ordered, and determined before the Judges of the King's Courts openly
in the King's Courts, whither all persons may resort." Id.; see also People v. Hartman,
103 Cal. 242, 245 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1894). The California Supreme Court wrote: "The doors
of the courtroom are expected to be kept open, the public are entitled to be admitted, and
the trial is to be public in all respects." Id.
51 See Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d at 1066 (holding that the public has First
Amendment right of access to preliminary injunction hearing in civil securities
litigation); Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 22 (2d
Cir. 1984) (holding that the public and press have First Amendment right to attend, but
not to televise, civil trial); In re Iowa Freedom of Information Council, 724 F.2d 658, 664
(8th Cir. 1984) (holding that the First Amendment right of access applies to civil
proceedings for contempt, but portions of proceeding involving trade secrets may be
closed).
52 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 508-09
(1984). The Court granted the newspaper's request to review a transcript of the voir dire
proceedings and affirmed the press's right to attend jury selection. Id. at 513. Such a right
is not absolute but can be overcome "by an overriding interest based on findings that
687
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Supreme Court has held that anyone is entitled to review evidence introduced
in open court or in unsealed court files, as such access is presumptively
guaranteed to the public and the press.53 It should be noted that the First
Amendment protection of access to these documents is not absolute. 54 For
example, the Supreme Court has also ruled that there is no absolute First
Amendment right of access to documents filed with the court in discovery,
such as pre-trial depositions and interrogatories. 55
The case law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction as to whether a
particular document is available to the public. 56 The Seventh Circuit ruled
last year that a settlement agreement is presumptively a public document if it
is filed with the court, while the Second Circuit has ruled that it is
presumptively secret, as the interest in encouraging of settlements outweighs
the "negligible to non-existent" right of public access. 57 Access to some
documents is often determined on a case by case basis: the D.C. District
Court ruled last year that while there was no blanket access to depositions,
news organizations were entitled to redacted transcripts and videotape
recordings of the depositions of four top executives of Microsoft and its
competitors taken in New York's antitrust suit against the technology giant. 58
While access is not always guaranteed under traditional litigation, at a
minimum, the current constitutional guarantees of access are the benchmark
closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest." Id. at 510.
531d.; see also Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 589-90
(1978) (finding a common law right of access to judicial records).
54 See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) (holding that the U.S.
Secretary of State may refuse to issue visas to visit Cuba to journalists without infringing
on the First Amendment). "The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the
unrestrained right to gather information." Id. at 17.
55 Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984). The Court held that there
is no constitutional right of access to confidential financial information revealed in
discovery. Id.
56See Douglas Lee, Courtroom Access, Overview, Freedom Forum, at http://
www.firstamendmentcenter.org/Press/topic.aspx?topic=courtroomaccess (last visited
Dec. 28, 2003). Lower courts are split on whether reporters should have access to
videotapes, audiotapes and documents that are introduced as evidence. Id.; see also
Gauthier, supra note 15.
57 Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2002) (settlement of wrongful
termination suit by former vice president of public college was presumptively public);
United States v. Glens Falls Newspapers Inc., 160 F.3d 853, 858 (2d Cir. 1998) (refusing
to open settlement agreement in case alleging toxic waste violations by General Electric).
58 New York v. Microsoft, 206 F.R.D. 19, 24 (D.C. 2002). The court ruled that
Microsoft had failed to prove under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) that providing
such access would be "burdensome or oppressive." Id.
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against which alternative dispute resolution should be measured.59 Yet
confidential settlements, mediation and arbitration are chipping away at the
press's access to vital public information, with potentially grave
consequences .60
III. FIRST STAGE OF EROSION: CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENTS HIDE
OUTCOMES OF DISPUTES
The first stage of erosion of public access to information is being caused
by confidential settlements. Under such secret agreements, the outcomes of
meritorious suits are removed from public scrutiny. Indeed, confidentiality is
often cited as one of the best ways to encourage settlement of litigation and
to clear crowded court dockets.61 However, confidentiality can also subvert
the presumption of open courts, chipping away at the public's constitutional
right to know.
One of the great advantages of settlement, especially for defendants, is
the secrecy of the precise terms of the settlement.62 Parties often choose to
settle their cases only to avoid the publicity associated with litigation.63
Proponents of confidentiality argue that if settlements are not kept
confidential, there will be no incentive for parties to settle. 64 They also claim
that if settlement terms are revealed, losing parties would be deluged with
unmeritorious follow-up lawsuits because a company's intimate details or
trade secrets would have been revealed. 65
To be sure, businesses have a legitimate need to keep certain business
information as confidential as possible from their competitors. 66 This is
59 See Reporters Committee, Comments, supra note 41.
60 Id.; see also Hochberg, supra note 2.
61 See Richard A. Epstein, The Disclosure Dilemma; Why a Ban on Secret Legal
Settlements Does More Harm Than Good, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3, 2002, at Di.
62 See also, e.g., J. Ben Shapiro, Using Mediation and Arbitration to Resolve
Construction Disputes, Bus. CREDIT, Nov.-Dec. 1, 2002 at 59. Shapiro refers to one
advantage of mediation and arbitration that "[t]he process does not appear on a public
court record or in the press." Id.
63 Jessup, 277 F.3d at 928 (holding that a settlement agreement including a
confidentiality agreement, while usually secret, becomes public if it is placed in the file at
the court clerk's office); see also Shapiro, supra note 62.
64 See Epstein, supra note 61.
65 Id.
66 Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 109
YALE. L.J. 1885, 1886 (2000). In arguing for alternative damage measurements in
contract disputes, the authors argue that the type of information that must be revealed in
order to receive expectation damages-business information related to the promisee's
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especially true in cases involving trade secrets such as scientific and
technological developments when disclosure could be very costly to one or
both parties involved. 67 This may also be true of other secrets, such as
blueprints or marketing plans.68 Businesses also have a valid interest in
maintaining their image and goodwill, which may motivate them to settle
embarrassing lawsuits. Yet the duty to inform the public in cases of public
safety or interest is sometimes greater than an individual or company interest
in privacy.69
A. Why Outcomes Matter
Proponents of confidentiality in resolving business disputes argue that
privacy interests outweigh the public's right to know about the outcome of a
settlement.70 But outcomes do matter. As the final determination, whether
court-ordered or consented to, outcomes are important indications of the
merit of a dispute. 71 Hiding the outcome of meritorious dispute can shield the
losing party from any implication that it has done something wrong, which
can have greater consequences down the line. 72
To give guidance to the public about whether a lawsuit was frivolous or
meritorious, journalists often seek the terms of the settlement.73 For example,
in 1997, the Wilmington Morning Star in North Carolina published a front-
page story that Conoco, Incorporated was to pay more than 170 trailer park
residents $36 million to settle a suit alleging that its gasoline had
operations, such as materials and labor costs, inventory size, availability of alternative
suppliers, the identity of her downstream contracting partners (customers), and, in the
case of newer businesses, her business plan-is precisely the kind that businesses may
choose to keep confidential. Id.
67 Francois Dessemontet, Arbitration and Confidentiality, 7 AM. REv. INT'L ARB.
299, 301 (1996).
68 Id.
69 See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding
that public's right to know about a settlement outweighed company's right to privacy in a
suit over alleged environmental contamination).
70 See Epstein, supra note 61.
71 Ralph Ranalli, Lawyers Want to Limit Secret Settlements, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
25, 2000, at Al. Then-Massachusetts Bar Association President Edward P. Ryan Jr. said,
"If these agreements are made public generally, that may well give the company an
impetus to change, modify, or improve the product. Keeping things quiet allows them to
maintain the hazard and simply cost out the risk of a lawsuit, versus the cost of taking
corrective action." Id.
7 2 Id.
73 WEINBERG, supra note 9, at 269. "It is up to journalists to arrive at the best
approximation of truth when the judicial system does not." Id.
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contaminated underground drinking wells. 74 The settlement agreement was
supposed to be confidential but a reporter at the newspaper obtained the
settlement amount from interviews with two sources. 75 Then, another
reporter requested the case file from the courthouse, which apparently had a
copy of the settlement inside, confirming the sources' figure. 76 The
newspaper published a story revealing the settlement amount. 77
While the payment of a large settlement is not the same as an admission
of responsibility, it is still a salient fact that should be reported to the public.
The public had a right to know that the allegations existed and a right to
know how much Conoco was willing to pay to settle them. Otherwise, the
absence of a settlement in the public record would permit Conoco to deny
that it bore any liability for the contamination. The proliferation of such
secret settlements has allowed businesses to treat liability in public safety
cases as business expenses rather than court-ordered mandates to change
their behavior.78
B. The Movement to Ban Secret Settlements
Cases such as Conoco or Ford-Firestone have led consumer advocates
across the country to seek statutory bans on such settlements. 79 Virginia has
an anti-secrecy statute that prohibits confidential settlements in personal
injury and wrongful death cases. 80 Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, and
Washington have statutes with anti-secrecy provisions covering disputes over
public hazards. 81 Nine states have statutes or court rules with anti-secrecy
74 Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 282, 284-85 (4th Cir. 2000).
75 Id. at 285.
7 6 Id. at 285 n.3. Conoco moved to have the two reporters and the paper held in civil
contempt for violating the court ordered confidentiality of the settlement. Id. at 285. The
local U.S. Attorney wanted to press criminal contempt charges but U.S. Attorney General
Janet Reno would not authorize it; the district court judge appointed an independent
counsel to prosecute. Id. at 285 n.4. The reporters were found in criminal contempt and
one was jailed for five days while a stay was pending. Id. at 286-87. Ultimately, the
Fourth Circuit overturned the district court. Id. The reporter was not required to divulge
his source and the contempt citations were reversed because the confidentiality order was
invalid and the public was not properly notified about the pending settlement. Id. at 288.
77 Id. at 285.
78 See Ranalli, supra note 71.
79 Gleba v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., No. 98-230, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 364, at
*9-10 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 2001).
80Id.
81 Id.
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provisions "applicable to court records in general."' 82 In Massachusetts,
legislation is pending which would regulate confidentiality agreements,
settlement agreements, and protective orders in cases of environmental
hazard, financial fraud or defective products. 83 In South Carolina and
Florida, federal judges are finalizing plans to ban confidential settlements in
their courtrooms, the first such bans in the nation. 84
Even without such measures, judges already have the ability to block
secret settlements on a case-by-case basis.85 In 2001, a Massachusetts judge
refused to enforce a confidentiality agreement in a settlement of a wrongful
death suit against DaimlerChrysler over a defective door latch on a 1988
Dodge Aries. 86 The judge stated it was "beyond the court's comprehension"
how a defective latch on an 11-year-old car could be considered a trade
secret that must be protected. 87 The court found that the public's right to
know "information which reveals the hidden dangers to other potentially
affected members of the public" outweighed any privacy interests of the
manufacturer. 88
However, many other courts have enforced confidentiality agreements.
The Second Circuit is noted for its enforcement of confidential settlements,
even in cases of public interest and government entities. In United States v.
Glens Falls Newspapers, Inc., a suit over carcinogenic water contamination
by General Electric, the court refused to open settlement documents to the
82 Id. They are Arizona, California, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Jersey and New York. Id.
83 S.B. 1021, 18 3rd Gen. Ct., 2003-2004 Sess. (Mass. 2003), available at
http://www.state.ma.us/legis/bills/stOlO2l.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2003). The bill has
been referred to the Massachusetts Joint Committee on the Judiciary.
84 See Hochberg, supra note 2.
85 See, e.g., Smith v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., No. 87-21 10-EEO, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6114, at *9-11 (D. Kan. Apr. 28, 1993). The court declined to impose
confidentiality on the parties who were settling a dispute over MCI's failure to pay a
class of telemarketers promised commissions. Id. at * 1, 8. The plaintiff class had not
agreed to keep the terms confidential and the court noted that no court had ever imposed
confidentiality when the parties themselves did not agree to it, because the First
Amendment bans prior restraint of the parties' right to free speech, should they choose to
exercise it. Id. at *9-11. See also Gleba v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., No. 98-230, 2001
Mass. Super. LEXIS 364, at *9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 2001).
86 Gleba, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 364, at *9.
87 Id. at *3.
88 Id. at *8.
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press.89 It reasoned that the confidentiality was essential to the process of
settlement and outweighed the public's right to know. 90
C. Precedent Snuffing Also Hides Outcomes
In addition to confidential settlement agreements, which keep negotiated
outcomes from becoming public, there is also a growing trend toward
"precedent snuffing," which allows parties to wipe judicial decisions from
the record.9 1 Parties that reach a settlement during the appeals process submit
a joint motion for vacatur to the trial court to unpublish the earlier opinion.92
The loser at the trial level is then able to maintain in future actions that there
is no precedent supporting their liability.93 This re-writing of history is just
an extension of the secret settlement, so that secrecy swallows the whole
case, not just the outcome. 94
Critics argue that parties will not be inclined to settle litigation if they
cannot ensure confidentiality. 95 The result of such attempts to ban
confidential settlements may ultimately-and ironically-constrain public
access to information even more; parties that are concerned about publicity
may be more inclined to proceed to arbitration and mediation, which limit the
access of the press and public even more. 96
IV. SECOND STAGE OF EROSION: ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION HIDE
VITAL PUBLIC ISSUES
Confidential settlements, the first stage of erosion, usually hide only the
final result of a dispute by obscuring the matter in a secret settlement. The
second stage of erosion is more destructive: not only is the end of a dispute
hidden, but so too is the beginning and the middle, such that the public likely
89United States v. Glens Falls Newspapers, Inc. 160 F.3d 853, 856-57 (2d Cir.
1998).
90 Id.
91 Catharine Yang, Rulings for Sale?: The High Court Weighs "Precedent
Snuffing," Bus. WK., Oct. 17, 1994, at 56.
92 Id.
93 See id.
94 See id. Proponents of precedent snuffing say it is yet another way that courts can
encourage settlement and decrease the burden on their dockets, while critics claim that it
enables powerful defendants to override the judicial system. Id.
95 See Hochberg, supra note 2; Epstein, supra note 61.
9 6 See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000). In
holding that settlement agreements should be open to the public, the court noted that
parties who want secrecy should "opt for arbitration." Id.
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never even knows such a dispute existed.97 This second stage of erosion does
not push the benchmark of public access back-it erases it completely.
Unlike traditional litigation, where the courts are presumptively open, all
of the proceedings in mediation and arbitration, including the outcome, are
usually confidential. 98 The fact that a dispute exists may itself be a secret. 99
Publicly-filed lawsuits that once appeared on a docket or in a courtroom
disappear completely from public scrutiny. 100 Under mediation and
arbitration, the press enjoys access only to information that parties are
willing to grant. 10 Other persons may attend mediation or arbitration
proceedings, but only with the permission of all parties and the mediator.
10 2
According to journalists, that permission is seldom granted. 103
No consistent federal policy exists yet regarding the confidentiality of
alternative proceedings in either the courts or in statutes. The Federal
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 states that local court rules
should prohibit disclosure of confidential dispute resolution communications
until the act addresses confidentiality. 104 Journalists have criticized the act,
and ADR in general, arguing that "the First Amendment, common law and
statutory rights of access often subject court materials to disclosure, and
luring parties with promises of ordinarily unavailable confidentiality is an
inappropriate way to encourage administrative dispute resolution."' 10 5
The argument for preserving the confidentiality of arbitration and
mediation is that it is essential to the efficacy of the process, as well as one of
its advantages over litigation. 10 6 However, in the rush to promote arbitration
and mediation, proponents fail to adequately address the damage done by
such secrecy-that it allows participants to hide behind the veil of private
justice and to avoid the public scrutiny that democracy requires.
97 Dessemontet, supra note 67, at 300.
98 Id.
99 Id.
10 0 JACQUELINE M. NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 181 (2001).
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 See Gauthier, supra note 15. Courts have often denied access to proceedings such
as settlement conferences and summary jury trials because confidentiality was essential
to the sincerity of the parties in their negotiations. Id.
104 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (2000). The act requires that every federal district court
implement a dispute resolution program.
105 See NEWS MEDIA UPDATE, supra note 15.
106 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 6, at 419-23.
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A. The Case for Confidentiality in Arbitration and Mediation
According to its proponents, confidentiality is a key component of
effective alternative dispute resolution. 10 7 The case for confidentiality in
dispute resolution is intuitive: the parties start off in opposite corners of the
ring. A confidential process allows parties to develop trust and work more
cooperatively. 108 The assurance of confidentiality creates the type of
atmosphere needed for honest and genuine communication. 109 Parties are
more apt to disclose information essential to resolving the dispute if they are
assured privacy and discretion) 10 In mediation and arbitration, such frank
disclosure is also crucial to allowing the arbitrator or mediator to understand
the full scope of the issues that are to be resolved, so that she may better
fashion a resolution. I 1 Parties cannot present their needs or interests if they
worry that they will be used against them in another forum or proceeding. 112
Confidentiality also reduces self-aggrandizing abuse of the process: if the
parties know the contents of the proceedings will remain secret, there is no
incentive for grandstanding or "getting something on the record." 13 Finally,
secrecy encourages those who wish to hide their disputes from the public to
resolve them, rather than allowing them to fester. 114
For these reasons and more, confidentiality agreements are ubiquitous in
arbitration and mediation. 115 For example, the mediator in the Ohio school-
funding case proposed the following terms of confidentiality:
I would presume that the first and most effective measure to provide
and ensure confidentiality would be a ground rule adopted by the parties
107 Id. For example, more than 200 state and federal statutes, as well as many case
decisions, govern confidentiality in mediation. Id. at 420.
108 Id.
109 See, e.g., Stephen G. Bullock & Linda Rose Gallagher, Surveying the State of the
Mediative Art: A Guide to Institutionalizing Mediation in Louisiana, 57 LA. L. REV. 885,
950 (1997). The authors describe the value of confidentiality to mediation, which applies
generally to confidential settlement negotiations and arbitration proceedings as well. Id.
110 Id. "Confidentiality engenders frankness and facilitates a complete exploration of
the issues underlying the parties' dispute." Id.
Il' Id.
112 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 6, at 419-20. "In an era of televised trials and
legislative debates ... greater protection from the public eye may make dispute
resolution especially attractive today and even a prerequisite to the frank exchanges
needed to reach consensus." Id.
113 See Bullock & Gallagher, supra note 109, at 951.
1 15 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 6, at 419-20.
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under the applicable provision of the Order. Of course, I can promise no
breach of confidentiality by myself but only suggest to the parties that, were
a party to breach in violation of a ground rule and the Order, it might fatally
undermine the mediation desired by the Court. There is a repertoire of
strategies ... [including] a mediator's "blackout," the development of joint
releases, shared press conferences, reporting only through the mediator, and
developing understandings as to the scope of the parties' internal
communications. 116
The mediator and the participants in this process agreed that public
communication was not only be undesirable; it would be "fatal."' 117
B. The Case Against Confidentiality in Arbitration and Mediation
Confidentiality is clearly a legitimate procedural component of
alternative dispute resolution. 118 It may also be a selling point to convince
parties to choose arbitration or mediation over litigation. 119 Yet these are less
compelling justifications when balanced against the loss of public
information and the erosion of the freedom of the press that results from the
secretive facets unique to arbitration and mediation.
Alternatives such as mediation and arbitration infringe more on the
public's right to know than traditional litigation. 120 When disputes are
initially shifted to mediation or arbitration, the public never receives notice
that a dispute exists.1 21 If the dispute is one of public interest, the public is
also denied the opportunity to observe and participate in the resolution of the
dispute. 122 Without a judge to shepard the process, confidentiality
agreements that are against public policy may nevertheless be implemented,
thereby unconstitutionally restricting the public's access to information. 123
Because the press and the public are unfamiliar with mediation and
arbitration, it is more difficult for them to find out what information is
publicly available. 124 The press is also unable to scrutinize the work of
116Letter from Howard S. Bellman, Mediator and Arbitrator, to John J.
Dilenschneider, Counsel to the Court, Supreme Court of Ohio, (Dec. 4, 2001), available
at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/derolph/dilenschneider.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2003).
117 Id.
1 18 See supra Part IV.A.
1 19 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 6.
120 See Reporters Committee, Comments, supra note 41.
121 See infra Part IV.B.1
122 See infra Part IV.B.2
123 See infra Part IV.B.3
124 See infra Part IV.B.4
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mediators and arbitrators, which may lead to an increase in conflicts of
interest and improper behavior that is hidden from public scrutiny and
accountability. 125 These downsides, unique to arbitration and mediation,
demonstrate how the growing popularity of such alternatives is eroding the
public's right to know.
1. Public Does Not Get Notice That a Dispute Even Exists
One of the biggest drawbacks of mediation and arbitration is that the
press and the public may not even know that a dispute exists. 126 It is common
practice for journalists to consult the civil and criminal dockets of their local
courthouse to discover whether there is anything of public interest being
litigated. 127 The Watergate burglary in 1972 is perhaps the best-known
example of this type of news-gathering. Had a police reporter for the
Washington Post not checked the Washington, D.C. police log for overnight
arrests, the nation might never have found out about the burglary at the
Democratic headquarters that eventually revealed the extensive corruption
and illegal practices of the Richard Nixon presidency. 128 Yet if disputes are
never even entered onto a civil or criminal docket, there is little chance that
the press and the public will ever know about them.
2. Public Interest Disputes Should Be Subject to Public Scrutiny
In addition to shielding the existence of disputes, arbitration and
mediation may improperly stifle public debate on matters such as education,
public finance, and equal protection. 129 For example, the Ohio Supreme
Court sent a statewide school finance dispute to mediation when the parties
could not agree on how to change the school funding formula. A mediated
settlement could have bound the legislature and every taxpayer to a monetary
125 See infra Part IV.B.5
126 Dessemontet, supra note 67, at 301.
127 See Reporters Committee, Comments, supra note 41.
12 8 See generally BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN
(1974).
129 See generally Fiss, supra note 38. Courts have often found that settlement
agreements by government agencies and public schools are public records. See, e.g., Des
Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist. Pub. Records v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 487
N.W.2d 666, 670 (Iowa 1992) (holding that settlement of suit by former principal
alleging discrimination must be unsealed under state public records law). But see Pierce
v. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist., 981 P.2d 600, 604 (Colo. 1999) (holding that the First
Amendment does not bar public entities from entering into confidential settlements where
interest in efficient resolution outweighs public access).
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commitment that they would have no participation in crafting and no
opportunity to reject. 130 Similarly, the educators and children most affected
by the educational system would have only been represented by the lawyers
for the plaintiffs in the case, rather than the duly-elected leaders of their
communities or associations. 131
In the legislature, where public-financing and education decisions are
usually made, discussions are held by elected representatives in open
sessions with transcripts and press reports. 132 The press covered the court
proceedings of the school-funding lawsuit heavily, 133 yet the mediation of
Ohio's school-funding dispute occurred without a single non-interested party
as a witness. 134 There was no way for the court, the press or the public to
evaluate the process of negotiation. The final report from the mediator was
68 words long, most of which were pleasantries:
This is the final report specified on the Court's Order on Motion for
Reconsideration entered November 16, 2001.
While the parties have worked hard and been cooperative with me in
every way, I must report that my mediation has not produced a resolution.
Thank you for the confidence that has been expressed by my
appointment. I am very sorry that I could not achieve the desired end. 135
This report tells us nothing about the positions that the parties took, the
concessions they were willing to make, or the possible solutions they
130 Stephen Ohlemacher & Julie Carr Smyth, Coalition Softens on School
Financing; High Court Suggests Possible Mediators, THE PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 17, 2001,
at Al. The parties were ordered to settle the dispute as to what would constitute a
"complete systematic overhaul" of the unconstitutional school-funding system. Id. The
result of that mediation, if approved by the Ohio Supreme Court, would have been
binding on the legislature in determining its funding formula, which sets the tax rates for
state citizens and the funding rates for public schools. Id.
131 Id
132 See, e.g., Lee Leonard & Alan Johnson, House Panel Rejects Taft Plan: Bill
Would Forbid Governor from Cutting Education Funding, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Feb. 12, 2003, at Cl.
133 See, e.g., Lee Leonard, School Funding Case to Open in High Court, THE
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 8, 1996, at Cl (reporting on the opening of oral arguments);
Scott Stephens & Mario Gortiz, Parents and Educators Agree with High Court
Conclusion, THE PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 25, 1997, at Al (reporting that Ohio Supreme
Court had found that the state's school-funding formula was unconstitutional).
134 DeRolph v. Ohio, 758 N.E.2d 1113, 1116 (Ohio 2001). See supra text
accompanying note 18.
135 Letter from Howard S. Bellman, Mediator to Thomas J. Moyer, Chief Justice,
Supreme Court of Ohio (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/
derolph/bellman3-21.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2003).
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proposed. Such information would assist the other players in settling this
dispute or allow the public to evaluate the performance of the government
officials and plaintiffs involved. Yet the press and the public were precluded
from access to such information.
Mediation can unfairly shield other disputes from public view, such as
the sex-abuse scandal in the Roman Catholic Church. The leaders of two
large dioceses in Southern California proposed mediating the claims of 150
alleged victims of sexual abuse, contending that more money would be
available for settlements if costly litigation is avoided. 136 These leaders also
pointed out that mediation would avoid embarrassing publicity for victims
who would prefer their complaints be settled quietly.1 37 However, the costs
of mediation would be great. Because the Church is a private organization,
lawsuits are one of the only ways that members, law enforcement, and the
public can find out what is going on inside.' 38 Critics of the proposal argue
that by keeping the facts and settlements of the disputes out of the public eye,
the Catholic Church will never face the true magnitude and costs of the
molestation scandal that has victimized its young parishioners for decades. 139
Mediation is more restrictive of information than pre-trial negotiations in
litigation. Under rules of evidence, parties may not reveal positions taken
during settlement negotiations as an admission of liability. 140 Yet parties may
reveal and make use of factual statements made during negotiations, which
may advance the public's knowledge of the dispute.141 However, in
mediations, parties bound to confidential agreements, such as the one used in
the Ohio school-funding case, are not permitted to reveal anything that
emerged during mediation, factual or otherwise.1 42 In cases that begin in
mediation and arbitration, the proceedings are further shrouded by the fact
that the complaints and other documents are never made public. Such
proceedings may serve to make the public less interested in and less trusting
of governmental functions, the opposite intention of our open judicial
system. 143
136 Thomas D. Elias, Quiet as a Church Mouse: Catholics' Continuing Secrecy
Policy on Abuse Will Backfire, DAILY NEWS, Jan. 24, 2003, at 15A.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 408.
141 Id. (advisory committee's note).
142 See supra text accompanying note 116.
143 See supra Part H.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
3. No Neutral Gatekeeper to Weigh the Public's Interest in
Information
In the absence of a judge who may protect the public interest,
confidentiality agreements that are against public policy will nevertheless be
enforced, thereby unconstitutionally restricting the public's access to
information. Take, for example, the difference between settlements resulting
from arbitration or mediation and approved settlements in class action
litigation. Mediation and arbitration usually proceed to resolution without the
safety net of a judge who reviews and approves a settlement. 144 On the other
hand, the settlements of class action litigation require the approval of a judge
to determine if the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and to assure
that the class members' interests are protected. 145 Thus an unfair
confidentiality agreement or one that is contrary to the interests of the class
or the public may not be enforced. 146
Judicial monitoring is not usually present in mediation or arbitration.147
Mediation settlements are left entirely to the parties and do not pass through
the judicial system unless judicial enforcement is required after the fact. 148
While arbitration awards may be reviewed by a judge if a party seeks to have
it vacated or modified, this is infrequent because voluntary compliance with
arbitral awards is usually high. 149 Without a judge, there is no neutral party
to balance the need for secrecy against the right of the public to know, as the
mediators and arbitrators are predisposed to support the traditional
confidentiality of their proceedings.150
144 NOLAN-HALEY, supra note 100, at 119, 181.
145 See Smith v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., No. 87-21 10-EEO, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6114, at *7 (D. Kan. Apr. 28, 1993) (declining to enforce a unilateral
request for a confidentiality agreement because it was against public policy, including
contract law and the First Amendment).
146 See id.
147 NOLAN-HALEY, supra note 100, at 119, 181.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 See Reynolds Holding, Millions Are Losing Their Legal Rights: Supreme Court
Forces Disputes from Court to Arbitration-A System with No Laws, S.F. CHRONICLE,
Oct. 7, 2001, at Al.
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4. Public and Press Unfamiliar with Arbitration and Mediation
Journalists and the public in general are not familiar with the systems of
mediation and arbitration,151 while non-lawyers tend to be mystified and
misinformed about the legal system in general, to which they have much
greater access. Nevertheless, the public and the press are cognizant of the
litigation process to the extent that they could easily access the information
revealed by it with a small amount of effort. 152 In contrast, their lack of
knowledge about mediation and arbitration hampers their ability to access
information. They are unlikely to know the distinctive features of the
procedures or about their rights. For example, journalists are unlikely to
know that they can request permission to attend mediation or arbitration
proceedings. 153 Thus, journalists and consumer advocates are unlikely to
access what little information to which they are entitled.
5. Lack of Public Accountability of Decisionmakers
A final downside to mediation and arbitration is the lack of public
accountability of decisionmakers. In the litigation context, judges are known
entities to the public. 154 Their work is published, their professional histories
can be traced, and their actions are ultimately subject to the inspection of the
press and the public. A corrupt judge who accepts campaign contributions in
exchange for favorable rulings can be uncovered through investigative
151 Gauthier, supra note 15; see also An interview with Richard C. Reuben,
available at http://www.rcfp.org/secretjustice/adr/interview.html (last visited Dec. 28,
2003). Reuben, an associate professor of law and adjunct associate professor of
journalism at the University of Missouri-Columbia and the editor of Dispute Resolution
Magazine, advises journalists about different ADR proceedings and argues that
confidentiality should be respected while still providing reasonable access to journalists.
Id.
152 See supra Part II. The public and the press are able to access many aspects of a
civil or criminal case, including the complaints, outcomes and often other publicly-filed
documents. See, e.g., WEINBERG, supra note 9, at 268. They can do it the old-fashioned
way-by going down to the courthouse and asking to see the file-or they can often look
up many of the documents on-line, either through Lexis and Westlaw, through free
systems such as the Public Access to Court Electronic Records or through jurisdictions'
individual websites. Id. Even when individual members of the public are not able or
willing to do such legwork, they can easily follow the contents and outcomes of
proceedings regarding public interest through press accounts. Id.
153 See NOLAN-HALEY, supra note 100, at 115.
154 WEINBERG, supra note 9, at 219. For example, in jurisdictions where judges are
elected, their campaign finance reports are public information. Id.
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reporting. 155 However, an arbitrator cutting similar deals is much less likely
come to the attention of the press or the public. 156 Even if an enterprising
reporter were to be interested in such information, it is difficult to track the
arbitrator's fees or decisions if the parties have agreed to confidentiality. 157
The few investigations of arbitration that have been done reveal that
arbitrators should be monitored as closely as our judicial system. 158 A 2001
series in the San Francisco Chronicle found that arbitration providers have
many undisclosed financial interests in companies that hire them to resolve
disputes; arbitration firms often provide administrative and consulting
services to those companies; and some firms court their clients by
emphasizing more favorable results, blurring the line between impartiality
and salesmanship. 159 One Los Angeles arbitration consultant gives judges
advice on how to impress a potential employer to secure a lucrative job as an
arbitrator. 160 Academic research has also found that companies are much
more likely to prevail in front of arbitrators they have hired before, thus
putting the company's opponent in such cases at a distinct disadvantage and
corrupting the process overall. 161
155 See Daniel R. Biddle et al., Disorder in the Court, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, 1986
(continuing series). This Pultizer-prize winning series on corruption among Pennsylvania
judges discovered that over a five-year period, defense lawyers active in campaigns for
municipal court judges won 71% of their cases before them, while the overall success
rate for the defendants was only 35%. Id. The series led to state and federal investigations
and an overhaul of the state court system; see also WEINBERG, supra note 9, at 219-22,
227-29 (remarking on other journalistic investigations of judicial corruption in
California, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, and Minnesota).
156 See, e.g., Holding, supra note 150.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.; see also Reynolds Holding, Judges' Actions Cast Shadow on Court's
Integrity: Lure of High-Paying Jobs as Arbitrators May Compromise Impartiality, S.F.
CHRONICLE, Oct. 9, 2001, at A13. Brochures from the American Arbitration Association
state that arbitration provides "more rational outcomes than [in] the jury system."
Reynolds Holding, Private Justice: Can Public Count on Fair Arbitration, S.F.
CHRONICLE, Oct. 8, 2001, at A15.
160 Id. A California Superior Court judge may earn about $130,000 a year, while an
arbitrator may earn up to $10,000 a day plus retirement pay. Id.
161 Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189, 210 (1997). Plaintiffs are systematically disadvantaged.
Employees appearing in front of arbitrators that have decided cases for their employer
before (repeat players) recover only 11% of what they demand, on average, while
employees recover 48% in cases involving non-repeat players. Id.
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The ethical dilemmas revealed by this series demonstrate that arbitration,
like the traditional court system, needs to be monitored by the press and the
public to ensure that justice is being served adequately and fairly. 162
V. STEMMING THE EROSION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESTORING
PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW
With access to information eroding under alternative dispute resolution,
it is crucial to ensure that reforms to all forums be advanced before the
public's right to know is irreparably eroded. Settlements should be
presumptively open, with the burden on the party seeking closure to justify
why the interest in secrecy outweighs the public's right to know. Arbitration
and mediation should be more transparent proceedings: providers should be
required to provide the public with notice that disputes exist, what parties are
involved, and the outcomes of such disputes. Journalists should enforce their
rights under current law to such information, using the courts to order access
if necessary. Parties and providers should work voluntarily to address these
issues of public interest so that courts do not have to intervene.
A. Settlements Should Be Presumptively Open
Confidential settlements should not be permitted in actions that concern
public interest, such as product safety, consumer issues, or other issues that
could be determined by judicial discretion. Models for such policy changes
have been implemented in several states, including the federal court in South
Carolina and state courts in Texas. 16 3
The South Carolina federal district court banned secret settlements last
year by local rule. 164 The ban applies to all settlements of cases pending in
162 See Holding, supra note 150.
163 See infra notes 167, 171 and accompanying text. Other states that have passed
antisecrecy measures include Virginia, North Carolina, Oregon, New York, Georgia and
Florida. Ashley Gauthier, Secret Justice: Alternative Dispute Resolution, Secret
Settlements in Hazardous Cases, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 2000,
available at http://www.rcfp.org/secretjustice/adr/hazardous.html (last visited Dec. 28,
2003). Virginia allows plaintiffs' attorneys to share information but not reveal it to the
public. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.01(A) (Michie 2001). North Carolina and Oregon
mandate that settlements with the government be open. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.3(b)(2)
(Lexis 2001). Georgia state law opens all documents filed with the court. GA. UNIF. SUP.
CT. R. 21. Florida law requires that all records concerning public hazards be public,
including settlements. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (2003).
164U.S. DIST. CT., D.S.C. R. 5.03 (amended Nov. 6, 2002), available at
http://www.scd.uscourts.gov/Rules/Mar2003/all2003.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2003).
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that court, regardless of whether they involve issues of public interest. 165
Critics have argued that a ban such as South Carolina's will only increase
litigation because it will encourage other plaintiffs to sue by revealing to
them exactly what a potential defendant is willing to pay. 166 While this
concern is valid, it is the inevitable by-product of any system of public
justice, and the values of an open judicial system far outweigh the concerns
of a few potential defendants. 167 Courts that are concerned about frivolous
litigation should throw out unmeritorious claims rather than hiding the
outcomes of meritorious ones.
Another model approach is that of Texas, which has adopted a
procedural rule that presumes that all court records, including settlements,
should be open to the public.' 68 Information may only be sealed if serious,
substantial harm could result from disclosure and the interest in sealing the
information clearly outweighs the public interest in access. 169 It also gives
third parties, such as the press, a right to intervene to oppose the sealing of
any records. 170
Such open-records rules are necessary fortifications to restore the open
nature of judicial proceedings and to shore up the constitutional benchmark
of access for the press and the public. 171
B. Arbitration and Mediation Should Be More Transparent
While many view confidentiality as a cornerstone of arbitration and
mediation, ensuring such secrecy could have a negative policy impact of
encouraging parties to use mediation and arbitration to subvert public goods
"Arguably, some lives were lost because judges signed secrecy agreements regarding
Firestone tire problems," wrote Chief Judge Joe Anderson explaining his decision to the
state's federal judges. Adam Liptak, Judges Seek to Ban Secret Settlements in South
Carolina, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 2, 2002, at Al, A13.
165 Id.
166 See Epstein, supra note 61.
167 See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding
that settlements should be open to the public). "When [parties] call on the courts, they
must accept the openness that goes with subsidized dispute resolution by public (and
publicly accountable) officials. Judicial proceedings are public rather than private
property." Id. (citing U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18,
27-29 (1994)).
168 TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(1).
169 Id.
170 TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(7).
171 See Miller, supra note 6, at 382.
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such as knowledge, safety, and justice. 172 While this may be a valuable
selling point for mediation and arbitration, it should not be one that providers
are willing to embrace. 173 Both providers and the media, not to mention the
public at large, have a vested interest in maintaining the integrity and
efficacy of dispute resolution proceedings. They should work both separately
and together to reach a balance between the public's right to know and the
legitimate need for some confidentiality.
1. Providers Should Release Limited Information on Disputes
The providers of mediation and arbitration should be required to provide
at least a limited amount of information about disputes. The Federal
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act should be amended to require that cases
involving public interest, such as product safety, education, or consumer
fraud be exempt from confidentiality. The providers of mediators and
arbitrators should also be required to publicly disclose the professional
backgrounds and client histories of its employees.
A model effort in this regard has begun in California, which now
prohibits arbitrators from handling cases for clients with whom they have
financial relationships. 174 The state has also begun requiring arbitration
providers to provide basic information about the resolution of consumer
cases, including the name of the non-consumer party, the nature of the
dispute, the outcome, the amount of the award and the number of cases the
arbitrator has handled for a party. 175 California's disclosure law should be a
model for other states to regulate their arbitration providers. Providers should
also be required to contribute to a federal registry of all arbitral awards,
which would serve as a national court docket for journalists and the public to
track the disputes of major corporations and other important organizations.
Arbitration and mediation providers should also provide adequate
education to the press and other interested parties, such as consumer or
investor advocates. Such education will serve two distinct purposes. The first
purpose is self-promotion: the better the press understands mediation and
arbitration, the more balanced its coverage will be of the growing trend. The
second purpose is more normative: providers who are serious about
maintaining the integrity and validity of mediation and arbitration should not
172 Union Oil, 220 F.3d at 568 (noting that parties who want secrecy may opt for
arbitration).
173 See Reporters Committee, Comments supra note 41.
174 Reynolds Holding, Consumers Get Arbitration Help: Breakthrough Laws Lift
Secrecy, Root Out Conflicts of Interest, S.F. CHRONICLE, Oct. 2, 2002, at Al.
175 Id.
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allow participants to take advantage of the press's ignorance of such
proceedings.
Because most mediation and arbitration processes are largely unregulated
by the government, changes that ensure public access to information will
have to be made voluntarily. The proponents of arbitration and mediation
may be resistant to this change, but if they do not make concessions to public
interest now, they may one day face a time when they do not have a choice.
If arbitration and mediation become so closely associated with public
deception and secrecy, the courts will become less tolerant of such
alternatives and may impose their own rules of public information on the
processes. 17 6
2. Journalists Should Educate and Empower Themselves
It is imperative that journalists educate themselves about arbitration and
mediation, both as to the procedures of the mechanisms themselves and as to
their rights under each type of proceeding and with the major providers. A
model for self-education is a series by the Reporters Committee for Freedom
of the Press, Secret Justice: Alternative Dispute Resolution, which informs
journalists about the different forms of ADR, the various court decisions
regarding ADR and a general description of press access to such
proceedings. 177 Reporters need to understand the mechanisms of confidential
settlements, arbitration, and mediation so that they may better report on such
proceedings. They should also understand the threat that such proceedings
pose to the public's right to know.
Once media organizations are educated, they should also empower
themselves: they should seek access to documents under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) 178 and sue to get access to mediation and arbitration
proceedings. 179 The FOIA allows journalists and other members of the public
to request information contained in the records of federal agencies. 180 The
FOIA, for example, has been successfully used by journalists to reveal that
176 See, e.g., Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co. v. O'Bannon, 15 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1935 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (granting access to civil arbitration award).
177 See Gauthier, supra note 15.
178 See How to Use the Federal FOI Act, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press, available at http://www.rcfp.org/foiact/guidea.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2003)
(detailing how to request information under the act).
179 See Gauthier, supra note 163. "Thus, the media should make efforts to challenge
sealing orders, as courts may find the sealing orders erroneous on their own." Id.
180 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2003). The FOIA makes all federal agency records
presumptively open upon request, subject to certain exemptions, such as executive
privilege or national security. Id.
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the federal government knew about safety problems at the ValuJet airline
before its fatal crash in 1996, to show that rape charges filed by women
enlisted in the U.S. Armed Forces were not taken seriously, and to publicize
governmental radiation experiments on its own citizens. 181 Many states also
have their own acts covering freedom of information or so-called "sunshine"
laws requiring open records. 182
If the parties are not government entities subject to freedom of
information laws, media organizations should consider suing parties to the
dispute, as well as the mediation and arbitration providers themselves. 183 A
few well-placed lawsuits seeking information about valid issues of public
importance could set precedents for opening mediation and arbitration
proceedings when they implicate public hazards or government actions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Alternative dispute resolution is eroding the public's access to
information about public interest and safety issues. Confidential settlements
are shielding corporations that put the public at risk from scrutiny by the
public and the press. 184 Arbitration and mediation allow powerful defendants
to avoid even the slightest risk of their disputes or liabilities becoming
public. 185 Without thoughtful attention to accommodating the need for the
press and the public to gain information about the issues that are revealed in
these forums, the efficacy of the judicial system as a guardian of public
181 See How to Use the Federal FOI Act, supra note 178. Journalists must make a
written request to an agency detailing the documents requested. See How to Use the
Federal FOI Act: A Brief Overview of How it Works, Reporter's Committee for Freedom
of the Press, available at http://www.rcfp.org/foiact/guide-b.html (last visited Dec. 28,
2003). The burden is on the government to produce the documents or show why they are
covered under an exemption within 20 days. Id. If the agency fails to respond or refuses,
the media organization may file a federal lawsuit seeking the document and may have
fees and court costs paid by the government if it prevails. Id.
182 See, e.g., Texas Public Information Act, TEX. GOv'T CODE ANN. § 552.001
(Vernon 1994); Connecticut Freedom of Information Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-200 to
1-241 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003). These laws are patterned on the federal FOIA and
work in substantially the same way. In some states, such as Connecticut, reporters can
file a complaint with the FOI commission if an agency fails to produce the documents.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-205(d). The commission may order an agency to produce
documents and, if the agency fails to do so, the commission may apply to a court to hold
that agency in contempt. Id.
183 See, e.g., Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co. v. O'Bannon, 15 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1935 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
184 See supra Part III.
185 See supra Part IV.
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interest is threatened. The press, the courts, and providers and proponents
must ensure that alternative dispute resolution is not used to subvert justice
or the public's right to know.
